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Although the behavior of credit markets
has long been recognized as revealing much
about the U.S. business cycle, the economic
meaning of credit market indicators has changed.
In particular, the differences—or spreads—be-
tween interest rates on various private- and
public-sector debt contain much valuable infor-
mation, but the economic inferences we can
draw from them have not always remained the
same. Thus, it is important to interpret different
credit market indicators carefully.
Such indicators drew much attention in
fall 1998, when financial markets were affected
by the global economic crisis and concerns that
the United States could face a credit crunch, in
which borrowers have trouble obtaining loans
or must pay interest rates far above U.S.
Treasury rates. At that time, world equity prices
plunged, and many U.S. firms found it difficult
to issue new credit instruments. And while
Treasury rates fell as investors fled to these safe
instruments, interest rates on private debt barely
declined and in some cases rose. As a result, the
spread between interest rates on ten-year Baa-
rated corporate and Treasury bonds widened to
levels typically seen in recessions (Figure 1). In
the past, however, movements in this spread
have not always been a reliable indicator of
business cycle downturns. One reason is that
interpreting credit market indicators can be
complicated in periods of market turmoil.
This article provides an overview of sev-
eral credit market indicators, showing that it is
important to carefully interpret what they can
tell us. The article reviews the economic ideas
behind certain domestic interest rate spreads
and Federal Reserve surveys of bank loan offi-
cers. The historical relationships of these indi-
cators to the U.S. business cycle are briefly
assessed and illustrated.
1 This article then inter-
prets what these varied indicators have been
telling us about credit market conditions since
late summer 1998, when securities markets were
very turbulent.
WHAT DO INTEREST RATE SPREADS TELL US?
Why It Is Important to Decompose 
Simple Interest Rate Spreads
The Baa–Treasury spread has risen sharply
during or before recessions and even when re-
cessions have not occurred. This mixed record
may result from this spread’s combination of
three different types of risk, for which investors
demand compensation and which have had dif-
ferent economic implications.
2
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spread is the prepayment premium to investors
for the risk that if interest rates fall in the future,
borrowers might retire old debt with new debt
at lower rates. Because investors can lose in
such cases, investors demand an extra return on
a bond if the issuer can pay it before maturity.
This extra return equals the perceived prepay-
ment risk multiplied by the market price of that
risk, both of which can vary.
Another component of the Baa–Treasury
spread is a liquidity premium that compensates
investors for the fact that private instruments are
less desirable to hold relative to U.S. Treasurys
when financial markets are turbulent and in-
vestors are very risk averse. The Baa–Treasury
spread also contains a default risk premium to
compensate lenders for the risk that borrowers
may not repay, reflecting the amount of default
risk posed and the price of risk.
These components of the Baa–Treasury
spread have behaved differently and have dif-
ferent implications. For example, at first glance,
the widening of the spread between yields on
ten-year Baa-rated corporate and Treasury bonds
in late 1998 might suggest the risk of an im-
pending recession. However, a less alarming
picture emerges from decomposing this spread
into the yield spread between Aaa- and Baa-rated
bonds, and the yield spread between the high-
est-grade corporate bond (Aaa) and Treasurys:
(Baa–Treasury) = (Baa–Aaa) + (Aaa–Treasury).
As shown below, the former component (which
rose much less) is more reflective of default risk
that is correlated with downturns, whereas the
latter type of spread (which widened much) is
more indicative of prepayment and liquidity risk
that is not closely associated with recessions.
For these reasons, it is important to interpret dif-
ferent types of interest rate spreads carefully.
Prepayment/Liquidity Premiums in 
Spreads Between High-Grade Corporate 
and Treasury Bonds
Investors demand a prepayment risk pre-
mium for the possibility that borrowers will re-
finance their debt if interest rates fall. Under
normal conditions, this premium is often
tracked by the gap between the average interest
rate on callable bonds of the highest grade—
Aaa-rated corporate bonds, which pose little
default risk—and that on a Treasury bond. With
little difference in default risk between such
bonds, the primary distinction between Aaa-
corporate and Treasury bonds is that when
interest rates fall, private-sector bonds often are
called and refinanced with new debt, whereas
Treasurys are not. For this reason, the Aaa–
Treasury spread contains a prepayment risk pre-
mium that reflects interest rate risk and the risk
of refinancing. However, as noted below, this
spread also contains a liquidity premium associ-
ated with a more stable demand for Treasury
securities.
Figure 1
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Another complication with yield spreads
between corporate and Treasury bonds is that
the call provisions on corporate bonds vary
within each grade of bond and also change over
time. As a result, the prepayment risk premiums
in corporate–Treasury yield spreads can vary
across time not only due to changes in the risk
that market interest rates will vary (henceforth,
interest rate risk) but also due to changes in the
practices regarding call provisions in bond
issues, as emphasized by Duffee’s (1998) re-
search. This source of measurement error makes
it difficult to separate the time-varying prepay-
ment risk premium in corporate–Treasury yield
spreads from other, more economically mean-
ingful components.
3
One interesting aspect of prepayment
spreads is that they are not closely associated
with recessions, as shown by the spread be-
tween Aaa-rated corporate and Treasury bond
yields in Figure 2. This is also true for another
measure of prepayment premiums, the interest
rate spread between residential mortgage-
backed securities and Treasurys. Since mort-
gage-backed securities are enhanced by col-
lateral and are viewed as having an implicit
guarantee from the federal government, these
securities are seen as posing little default risk.
But, if interest rates fall, many of the securities
are retired as the mortgages backing them are
refinanced by homeowners. Indeed, the
Aaa–Treasury spread and mortgage refinancing
activity have swung together since the recession
of 1990–91 (Figure 3). Nevertheless, it should
be noted that changes in the costs and ease of
refinancing have affected prepayment premi-
ums over time, as have changes in the liquidity
of these securities. This is true of the mortgage-
backed securities market, which became deep
and well-developed only in the mid- to late
1980s, well after the investment-grade corporate
bond market did so.
Figure 2
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Figure 3
AAA–Treasury Spread and Mortgage
Refinancing Activity Have Swung Together
Since the Last Recession
(Four-week moving average)
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As mentioned above, the Aaa–Treasury
spread normally includes not only a prepay-
ment premium but also a liquidity premium 
that is usually small and less important.
However, under unusual circumstances, this 
liquidity premium can become substantial, com-
pensating investors for the fact that private
instruments are less desirable to hold than
Treasurys when financial markets are turbulent
and investors are extremely risk averse.
For example, some analysts argued that
the big rises in common prepayment premium
measures in fall 1998 reflected not so much an
increase in prepayment risk as a flight to quality
in which investors fled falling stock prices by
shifting into the most liquid bond instruments,
Treasurys. The flight to quality bid down
Treasury yields more than private bond yields,
thereby widening the gap between the two.
From this point of view, last fall’s run-up in the
Aaa–Treasury spread is best interpreted as 
an increase in the so-called liquidity premium
associated with a rise in nervousness among
investors.
Commercial Paper–Treasury Bill Spreads as
Indicators of Liquidity Risk
A clearer gauge of the liquidity premium is
the paper–bill spread, the gap between interest
rates on top-grade commercial paper and Treas-
ury bills. Since commercial paper is short-lived,
it poses virtually no prepayment risk. In addi-
tion, because only the most creditworthy com-
panies have enough market credibility to issue
these short-term instruments, top-grade com-
mercial paper normally poses little default risk.
At one time, the paper–bill spread was
correlated with recessions, as emphasized by
Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Bernanke
(1990). However, since the mid-1980s, this spread,
like the prepayment spread, has not been
closely related to recessions (Figure 4 ). The
reasons for the earlier correlation are not com-
pletely clear, despite some attempts to explain
them (most notably, Bernanke and Blinder
1992). One possibility is that the paper–bill
spread spikes during periods of uncertainty,
when even the strongest companies posed
some default risk. Indeed, Hafer and Kutan
(1992) and Emery (1996) found that most of the
statistical significance of the paper–bill spread
in samples from the 1960s–1980s was the result
of an unusual spike in late 1973. This event
coincided with the first OPEC crisis of 1973,
when an oil embargo hurt the U.S. economy.
The OPEC crisis of 1973–74 was the first major
supply shock or stagflationary period in decades.
Because of its unusual character, the jump in
both inflation and unemployment confounded
many analysts and created uncertainty that led
investors to demand large risk premiums. On
these grounds, some critics of the paper–bill
spread believe that the spike of 1973 reflected
the impact of a big supply shock and this coin-
cidence makes the paper–bill spread appear to
be a better leading indicator than it really is.
Explanations for the more recent decline
in the information content of the paper–bill
spread relate to asset substitutability, as stressed
in the recent work of Friedman and Kuttner
(1998). In practice, commercial paper is highly
substitutable for uninsured large time deposits
(often called certificates of deposit, or CDs)
issued by banks or thrifts. During the thrift cri-
sis of the late 1980s, investors demanded higher
yields on many CDs, which because of market
practices also drove up commercial paper rates.
As a result, the paper–bill spread rose to high
levels in 1987 and falsely signaled an impending
recession in 1988–89.
Liquidity Premiums and 
On-the-Run/Off-the-Run Treasury Spreads
Other indicators of liquidity premiums are
on-the-run/off-the-run Treasury yield spreads.
These spreads are based on the implied hold-
ing-period yields of Treasury securities whose
remaining maturities do not precisely match up
with those on more recently issued Treasurys.
For example, an on-the-run Treasury at a three-
year maturity could be the most recently issued
three-year Treasury note, while a comparable off-
the-run security could be a three-year Treasury
Figure 4
Paper–Bill Spread a Less Reliable 
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note issued just a few months earlier. Normally
the implied yields on both securities over the
next two and three-quarters years would be
within a few basis points, with the on-the-run
issue having a lower yield. The most recent
issue is more liquid, partly because its maturity
more closely tracks time in rounded units. In
addition, new issues are more liquid with better
known trading prices because they have re-
cently been purchased by investors from pri-
mary dealers who bid on the bulk of gov-
ernment debt at Treasury auctions.
In turbulent markets, investors could pre-
fer the more liquid on-the-run issue, causing a
widening of the on-the-run/off-the-run spread.
As shown in Figure 5, such spreads have some-
times surged in times of market uncertainty,
such as in late 1989 and late 1998, when stock
prices fell. These spreads are indicative of the
liquidity of securities markets.
However, it is unclear what relationship
these spreads have to the overall U.S. economy.
One reason is the data needed to measure such
spreads have been consistently saved only since
1987. Because the data span only one business
cycle, there is not enough time series evidence
to confidently estimate the economic signifi-
cance of movements in this spread. Another
drawback is that on-the-run/off-the-run spreads
have been very noisy, sometimes widening dur-
ing periods of strong GDP growth. Finally, the
development of computer-driven trading may
have altered the behavior of these spreads and
their economic implications over time. For ex-
ample, some risky investors, including some
hedge funds, would bet these spreads would
return to normal after widening. Under normal
conditions, such strategies would help stabilize
these spreads. However, if investors become
averse to liquidity risk and wide spreads persist,
these strategies can lead to big losses, as hap-
pened to a prominent hedge fund in fall 1998.
Default Risk Premiums in Yield Spreads 
Across Corporate Bond Categories
Looking at spreads across different corpo-
rate bond categories is advantageous. These
corporate spreads are subject to fewer compli-
cations posed by prepayment risk than are cor-
porate–Treasury spreads because corporate
bonds have similar callability provisions.
4 This
implies that such spreads largely reflect default
risk premiums. Such premiums, which compen-
sate lenders for the risk that borrowers may not
pay back their debt, reflect the market’s assess-
ment of the magnitude of default risk posed and
the market price of a given amount of risk. The
latter depends on the supply of funds to that
sector, which in turn depends on how risk-
averse and liquid investors are.
Since the amount of default risk and its
price reflect cyclical conditions, the spread
between Baa and Aaa corporate yields has risen
during recessions (Figure 6 ) and—relative to
corporate–Treasury spreads—has a much lower
tendency to falsely signal recessions. As Jaffee
(1975) notes, corporate spreads are significantly
related to macroeconomic conditions, both in a
statistical and economically meaningful sense.
In practice, increases in such premiums also
have been associated with a tightening of credit
standards, which makes it more likely that credit
applicants get turned down by banks or get shut
out of the bond market.
There are, however, two drawbacks to
using these spreads. First, rather than giving
advance warning of recessions, they tend to rise
during recessions. This suggests they are better
coincident indicators than leading indicators of
economic activity. Second, the spreads have
tended to decline since 1983, making it difficult
to detect recession risk from the level of this
spread. For example, the Baa–Aaa spread rose
in the 1990–91 recession to a level near the
average for the nonrecession months of the
1970s and 1980s. Another recent example is the
run-up in this spread during the fourth quarter
of 1998, when securities markets were turbu-
lent. By itself, the increase in the spread sug-
gests a rise in the default risk premium.
However, because the level rose to the average
of the post-1982 period, it is difficult to tell
whether the recent run-up reflects a serious risk
of recession or a return to more normal risk-
Figure 5
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taking by investors after unusually low spreads
during the mid-1990s.
The downtrend of investment-grade spreads
since the early 1980s can be largely attributed to
a more stable environment stemming from a
shift to low inflation and a perception that the
U.S. economy is less susceptible to large down-
turns (for example, see Dudley and McKelvey
1998). Also contributing to the downtrend in
these spreads are several factors that deepened
the corporate bond market, making it less sub-
ject to price volatility associated with thin trad-
ing or periods of rumor-driven trading. One
factor is the improvement in information tech-
nology that has made it easier and cheaper for
investors to monitor firms, thereby making
investments less uncertain. Other factors have
boosted the retirement demand for corporate
bond investments, including the aging of the
baby boom generation,
5 the post–World War II
rise in the overall share of workers having some
form of pension benefits, and legal changes fos-
tering the growth of IRAs and 401K defined-
contribution pension accounts.
6 Together these
factors have made investors more willing to 
purchase lower rated investment-grade bonds,
thereby pushing down spreads such as the
Baa–Aaa yield spread.
It is important to note that the Baa–Aaa
spread reflects credit market conditions for well-
established, highly rated firms, whereas spreads
between investment-grade and below-investment-
grade bonds (so-called junk spreads) are indica-
tive of credit market conditions for mid-sized,
less well established firms. The advantage to
using investment-grade spreads is that their data
extend far back in time, giving us a record span-
ning several business cycles. By contrast, junk
bond indexes only extend to the mid-1980s,
when the junk bond market developed. In addi-
tion, the greater liquidity of the investment-
grade market implies that these spreads are more
indicative of fundamental factors affecting de-
fault risk premiums and less indicative of tem-
porary fluctuations due to market turbulence.
7
Indeed, as shown in Figure 7, junk bond
spreads jumped much more during the 1990–91
recession than did the investment-grade spreads
shown in Figure 6. The rise in junk spreads dur-
ing the most recent recession strongly suggests
that default risk affects junk spreads. However,
variation in liquidity risk plausibly affects junk
spreads more than it affects investment-grade
spreads. For example, during the early 1990s,
junk spreads were boosted by new regulations
and the resolution of the thrift crisis, which
forced the thrift institutions to sell their junk
bond holdings.
8 Given that many important in-
stitutional investors could not readily purchase
these securities, these sales greatly depressed
the prices of junk bonds, thereby pushing up
junk bond yields and spreads.
Figure 6
Default Premiums Tend to Rise During Recessions but 
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What Are Brady Bond Spreads and 
What Do They Tell Us?
Brady bond interest rate spreads are 
helpful gauges of credit market conditions in
emerging market economies. For reasons speci-
fied below, Brady bond spreads largely reflect
default risk and are associated with the avail-
ability of international funds to emerging
economies. What are Brady bonds? In exchange
for forgiving many nonperforming loans in 
the 1980s, lenders were repaid by some emerg-
ing market countries with Brady bonds that 
the lenders could hold in portfolio or sell in
credit markets. There are many types of Brady
bonds, but all offer some guarantee on the in-
terest payments or principal that removes 
much, but not all, of their risk. Many guarantees
use Treasury bonds as collateral that investors
can claim to cover missed interest or principal
payments.
To allow better comparisons of Brady
bonds with the bonds issued by other govern-
ments, the investment industry has created
claims on these bonds that take into account
these various kinds of partial guarantees. The
spreads between the yields on these “stripped
Brady bonds” and the yields on Treasury bonds
reflect the extra default and liquidity risk that
stripped Brady bonds pose relative to the debt
of very creditworthy nations such as the United
States. While in principle Latin American issuers
of Brady bonds can call their debt, in contrast to
the typical practice of the U.S. government,
Brady bonds are viewed as posing little, if any,
prepayment risk.
9
The first example of how stripped Brady
bond yield spreads behaved in a debt crisis
occurred during the 1995 peso crisis, when
Mexico devalued the peso after it could no
longer defend its fixed exchange rate. The
peso’s fall made it more uncertain whether
Mexican firms and the Mexican government
could repay debt for two reasons. First, it
implied that Mexican debtors would have to pay
more pesos to repay their foreign-denominated
debt. Second, the associated decline in the
Mexican economy decreased the likelihood that
Mexican debtors would have the revenue to re-
pay debt.
As a result, the default risk on Mexican
Brady bonds rose, and because the market for
them was thin, their liquidity risk premiums also
jumped. Compounding these problems was the
maturing of short-term debt issued before the
crisis. Investors either refused to buy any new
debt issued by Mexican firms and the Mexican
government to refinance the maturing debt or
demanded high interest rates to do so.
Several other Brady bond issuers had fol-
lowed policies similar to Mexico’s, such as fixing
exchange rates and borrowing much short-term
debt denominated in foreign currencies. Given
these similar risks, investors demanded higher
yields on Brady bonds or any debt issued in
such nations. As a result, stripped Brady bond
yields surged as Latin America experienced an
international credit crunch—credit inflows that
had funded economic growth suddenly dried
up while principal payments on old debt flowed
out to foreign investors (Figure 8). This credit
crunch created an economic slowdown in these
countries following the peso crisis.
Figure 7
Junk Bond Spreads Jump to 











’99 ’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90 ’89 ’88 ’87 ’86 ’85
NOTE: Bar indicates recession.
SOURCES: Moody’s Investors Service; Merrill Lynch.
Figure 8
Latin Brady Bond Default Risk Erupts Again
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WHAT DO FEDERAL RESERVE SURVEYS OF 
BANK LOAN OFFICERS TELL US?
Drawing economic inferences from inter-
est rate spreads is complicated by noise in inter-
est rates and the fact that many such spreads
contain different risk premiums that have differ-
ent economic implications. Therefore, it can be
helpful to consider information from surveys of
lenders to corroborate evidence on the avail-
ability of credit from interest rate spreads. For-
tunately, the Federal Reserve has collected such
information for three decades.
Specifically, the Federal Reserve has sur-
veyed large U.S. banks quarterly since the late
1960s about their lending practices, conducting
up to two extra surveys a year if conditions war-
rant. The questions have varied over the years,
but two types of questions have focused on the
degree to which loan applicants have been
denied credit. Up until the early 1980s and since
the early 1990s, banks have been asked if they
have tightened credit standards on business
loans and, since the early 1990s, on commercial
real estate loans. The quarterly surveys have
always asked banks whether they were more or
less willing to make consumer installment loans
than they were three months earlier. Responses
to these two kinds of credit-rationing questions
have been particularly informative during credit
crunches.
From both types of questions, analysts have
created diffusion indexes of the percentage of
respondents tightening minus those easing credit
standards to see whether large banks had, on
net, tightened or eased credit standards. Intui-
tively, if firms and households are more likely 
to be denied credit, spending on demand for
goods financed with credit would be restrained.
Schreft and Owens (1991) show that banks
tightened their credit standards on business
loans shortly before the recessions of 1970–71
and 1980 but tightened their standards during
the recessions of 1974–75, 1981–1982, and
1990–91. These simple patterns suggest that
tight credit conditions or credit crunches for
businesses may have induced or propagated
recessions, respectively. Unfortunately, changes
in survey questions in the late 1970s and the
absence of such credit-rationing questions dur-
ing much of the 1980s make it nearly impossi-
ble to use this survey evidence to consistently
estimate the economic effects of business credit
availability over the last few decades.
However, since the late 1960s banks have
been asked how their willingness to make con-
sumer installment loans has changed from three
months earlier. Using a diffusion index based 
on this question in econometric models, Duca
(1987) and Duca and Garrett (1995) have found
that banks’ decreased willingness to lend to
consumers has a statistically significant negative
effect on consumer durable purchases. In addi-
tion, this index turned down before most reces-
sions in the United States since the late 1960s,
with the notable exception of the last recession,
which was arguably prompted by an unex-
pected disruption of oil markets from the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait (Figure 9). The studies
mentioned above find that bank willingness to
make consumer loans falls as inflation-adjusted
interest rates rise or as the economic outlook
weakens. Both results support theoretical expla-
nations for the nonprice rationing of credit (see
the box titled “Why Loans Are Rationed With
Price and Nonprice Terms of Credit”). A de-
creased willingness to lend to consumers is likely
correlated with a tightening of bank credit stan-
dards on consumer loans, as implied by Schreft
and Owens (1991), who find that movements in
diffusion indexes of bank unwillingness to
make business loans and tighter credit standards
on business loans had a very high correlation
(0.80). For these reasons, the index of bank will-
ingness to make consumer installment loans
provides an historically long and useful gauge
of consumer credit markets.
WHAT HAVE CREDIT INDICATORS TOLD US ABOUT
CREDIT CONDITIONS SINCE FALL 1998?
Domestic Interest Rate Spreads
In early fall 1998, financial markets were
wracked by turmoil as investors feared that an
Figure 9
Banks Still Slightly More Willing to 
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economic slowdown would spread from some
emerging market economies to the rest of the
world. U.S. financial markets appeared to seize
up and stop normal functioning. Stock prices
were falling sharply and many firms could not
issue bonds, commercial paper, or stock. This
financial market distress was evident in spreads
between corporate and U.S. Treasury bond
yields, which jumped sharply. Close examina-
tion of the components of such spreads sug-
gests the rises primarily reflected jumps in
liquidity and prepayment premiums, as indi-
cated by bigger increases in the Aaa–Treasury
spread (Figure 2) than in the Aaa–Baa spread
(Figure 6 ). Junk spreads widened much more
than the Aaa–Baa spread did, but this may have
reflected more liquidity than default risk, given
the thinness of the junk bond market. Increased
prepayment risk was manifested in record levels
of mortgage refinancing and a fall in Treasury
interest rates. But a flight to quality may have
played a bigger role, as evidenced by investors’
flight from equities and by a rise in the paper–
bill spread (Figure 5) and in on-the-run/off-the-
run Treasury spreads.
When carefully interpreted, these spreads
did not collectively point to recession but, rather,
to a scenario of slow growth. Earlier in 1998,
fears of slowing export growth from weakening
foreign economies led to a decline in both
Treasury and private bond rates. This, in turn,
stimulated U.S. domestic demand and cush-
ioned U.S. economic growth from a fall in ex-
ports (see Duca, Gould, and Taylor 1998). While
fears of further global slowing in fall 1998 also
sparked declines in U.S. Treasury rates, many
private bond rates barely budged. In this sense,
the widening of prepayment/liquidity premiums
suggested that falling bond yields would not
stimulate domestic demand enough to prevent
falling net exports from slowing the U.S. econ-
omy too much. Against this backdrop and to
help stabilize shaky international financial mar-
kets, the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds
rate three times.
These actions helped restore financial
market confidence, as did a natural bounceback
in spending that followed a pause in consump-
tion associated with the stock market correction
in fall 1998. Since then, the run-up in the
paper–bill spread has unwound, while most of
the jumps in prepayment/liquidity risk measures
have reversed. One interesting development
was a further increase and then flattening of the
Aaa–Baa spread. Together with other spreads,
the rise in this default risk premium to its aver-
age level over 1983–98 suggests that while mar-
kets are more composed now than last fall,
investors are returning to more normal levels of
risk-taking in the bond market following the
exceptionally easy period of 1996–97.
Foreign Rate Spreads
Brady Bond spreads jumped in fall 1998 
to levels not seen since the 1995 peso crisis
(Figure 8), illustrating investor concerns that
emerging market nations would have greater
difficulty paying their debts because their
economies would slow and currency declines
would make it harder for them to pay back in
dollars. Since then, spreads have subsided and
by May 1999 had indicated that the severe credit
crunch gripping Latin America may be lifting.
Similar spreads between Asian issues of dollar-
denominated bonds and U.S. Treasurys suggest
the Asian credit crunch is subsiding.
Loan Surveys
The Federal Reserve conducted an extra
loan survey in September 1998 that focused on
Why Loans Are Rationed with 
Price and Nonprice Terms of Credit
Loans are made using more than just the price of credit (the interest rate)
because borrowers may not repay.Typically, lenders offer credit at different interest
rates to borrowers posing different levels of default risk, with some applicants denied
credit altogether. Assessments are often based on the borrower’s credit history,
wealth, income, proposed debt payments-to-income ratios, and, for mortgages, down
payment ratios (see Duca and Rosenthal 1991; Rosenthal, Duca, and Gabriel 1991).
Thus, credit is allocated or rationed using price (loan interest rates and fees) and
nonprice terms of credit, both of which can vary.
What could cause such a tightening of nonprice terms of credit? One theoretical
approach, typified by Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
stresses that lenders bear the downside risks of a loan and face asymmetric infor-
mation because potential borrowers know more about whether they will repay a loan
than do lenders. As interest rates rise, less risky and lower return projects drop out
of the pool of loan applications, while riskier ones remain. In addition to this adverse
selection effect, there is a moral-hazard problem in that borrowers have more incen-
tive to take bigger risks once they have a loan if they believe they cannot otherwise
repay. For some observably risky loan applicants, charging higher loan rates actually
worsens loan quality so much that it is not profitable to lend to them.Thus, higher
market interest rates or a deteriorating economic outlook makes it unprofitable to
lend to what had been marginally creditworthy loan applicants and induces lenders
to tighten credit standards used to approve loan applications.
Another approach to explaining the nonprice rationing of credit, typified by
Williamson (1986), stresses that lenders bear deadweight costs of default that bor-
rowers do not.These so-called agency costs of default include factors such as legal
actions and the interest costs of delays in collection, as well as the time and expense
incurred by lending staffs in monitoring delinquent loans and verifying defaults. As
stressed by the theoretical work of Townsend (1979), Lacker and Weinberg (1989),
and Lacker (1991), debt contracts may be superior to equity contracts for many types
of financing.The intuition is that if good economic conditions prevail, borrowers 
usually meet preset debt payments, and lenders avoid agency costs of verifying how
well a firm or household is doing. But, as argued by Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
although collateral can reduce this type of agency-cost-induced credit-rationing,
declines in asset values brought about by a deteriorating economic outlook or higher
interest rates can destroy collateral and cause a tightening of credit standards.
Higher interest rates also make it more likely that borrowers will not repay, boosting
expected agency costs and prompting tighter credit standards.11 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1999
credit standards. One key finding was that after
years of easing credit standards, banks slightly
tightened them for loans to large and medium-
sized firms, as shown in Figure 10. By contrast,
standards were little changed for small firms.
Banks that tightened standards did so mainly
based on a changing economic outlook. In
addition, the larger banks in this sample tended
to tighten more than the smaller ones. However,
banks reported that they continued, on net, to
be more willing to make consumer loans
(Figure 9). Although the index was less positive,
it remained above the negative levels of previous
recessions and credit crunches. Other questions
revealed slower loan demand by firms and
households in September 1998.
The loan surveys have several implica-
tions. First, they suggest that credit standards
had initially been tightened more for firms with
higher global exposure in fall 1998, as such
firms usually are bigger and also borrow from
larger and more internationally oriented banks.
Subsequently, credit standards for large and
medium-sized firms have been tightened some-
what further. Second, the surveys imply that
small firms experienced a mild tightening of
credit standards, but by no means a credit
crunch, as confirmed by survey evidence from
the National Federation of Small Businesses
showing that credit was widely available to the
small firms surveyed. Third, while bank willing-
ness to make consumer installment loans has
not been increasing as rapidly, households have
not been experiencing a credit crunch (Figure
9), consistent with strong growth in consump-
tion and consumer credit in late 1998 and early
1999. Together, these three findings suggest that
after years of easing standards, lending practices
may be returning toward more normal levels of 
risk-taking. Finally, businesses and household
borrowers initially became more cautious, con-
sistent with evidence of little hiring and little 
firing in early fall 1998. Since then, lending, con-
fidence, spending, and hiring have rebounded,
as the caution associated with financial market
turmoil has subsided.
CONCLUSION
This article shows that interest rate spreads
and loan surveys should be interpreted carefully
when assessing the availability of credit and its
impact on the economy. This is especially true
of interest rate spread indicators, some of which
reflect prepayment, liquidity, or default risk pre-
miums that have different relationships with eco-
nomic activity. It can be helpful to decompose
spreads before drawing economic inferences
from the structure of interest rates. Spreads be-
tween yields on non-top-grade private-sector
bonds and Treasury bonds, in particular, contain
a large prepayment premium in addition to a
time-varying default risk premium. With respect
to recent developments, this distinction especially
applies to the Baa–Treasury spread, which could
be easily misread as pointing to a severe credit
crunch in late 1998. In fact, a simple decompo-
sition of this spread, consistent with other indi-
cators, suggests the United States experienced
more of a credit pinch than a credit crunch in
late 1998 and early 1999.
It is also important to recognize that even
some decomposed spreads contain more than
one type of risk premium. In this regard, a
widening of some yield spreads that contain a
small default risk component, such as the
Aaa–Treasury spread, could arise from an
increase in prepayment and/or liquidity risk
premiums, whose magnitudes may be hard to
identify separately. Such was the case in late
1998, when mortgage prepayment activity set
records and the commercial paper–Treasury bill
rate spread pointed to a jump in liquidity risk
premiums.
NOTES
I thank William Gruben and Robert Moore for helpful
suggestions and Ricardo Llaudes for excellent
research assistance. Any errors are my own.
1 This article does not review yield curve interest rate
spreads, a subject that requires too much space and
that has been covered in a host of articles, such as
Bernanke (1990). In recent years, the yield curve has
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severely underestimated economic growth and has
given false signals.
2 Another component is tax treatment. In contrast to cor-
porate bond interest payments, interest earned on U.S.
Treasurys is not subject to state and local taxes. This
effect is not likely to shift the spreads significantly
because state income tax rates have not varied much
over time and because residents in states with high
state income taxes tend to buy municipal securities,
whereas Treasurys are more likely to be owned by 
residents in low-state-income-tax states, retirees in low
brackets, and institutional investors, who avoid most
income taxation. An additional complication is that
even if state income tax rates did not vary, the tax-
induced spread between corporates and Treasurys
could vary because the value of the tax exemption is
proportional to the level of interest rates.
3 There are other complications as well. For example,
the Aaa–Treasury spread has even turned negative on
rare occasions when the yield curve was inverted after
steep rises in interest rates. During these episodes,
markets may have anticipated such little prepayment
risk that the expected lifetime of corporate bonds
exceeded that of the noncallable ten-year Treasury
note. (Many corporate bonds have stated maturities
greater than ten years.) The implied negative term pre-
mium apparently outweighed the liquidity and default
risk advantages of the ten-year Treasury note. This
was so much the case that the ten-year Treasury yield
exceeded the average yield on Aaa-rated corporate
bonds, but the latter still exceeded the thirty-year
Treasury bond yield in such yield-curve twists when
the thirty-year Treasury bond was available.
4 Nevertheless, yield spreads across corporate bond
categories may reflect some differences in callability
provisions across corporate bonds, as suggested by
Duffee’s (1998) study.
5 Recent cross-section data on households indicate a
general shift in household portfolios toward bond and
equity mutual funds, for both IRA/401K assets and
non-IRA/401K assets (see Kennickell and Starr-
McCluer 1994).
6 In general, pensions include traditional defined-benefit
plans and IRA and 401K plans. Since the 1970s there
has been a shift away from defined-benefit pension
plans and toward defined-contribution pension plans.
One advantage of the latter is that a greater share of
the expected benefits is portable if employment at a
particular firm ends.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) and Ippolito (1995)
estimate that half the rise in the share of defined-con-
tribution plans (401K and traditional defined-contribu-
tion plans as a share of primary pension plans) results
from employment shifts away from firms that histori-
cally have favored defined-benefit plans—particularly
unionized and larger firms. Ippolito (1995) concludes
that the other half of this rise stems from tax law
changes that made 401K plans more attractive than
pre-1980 defined-contribution plans.
7 The investment-grade market is more liquid because
many institutional investors (such as pension funds
and life insurance companies) are explicitly or implic-
itly prohibited from investing in below-investment-
grade bonds.
8 I am indebted to Harvey Rosenblum for pointing this
out to me.
9 There are two primary reasons. First, most Brady bond
issuers are unlikely to be in a position to run budget
surpluses to pay down debt earlier than scheduled.
Second, these nations are unlikely to refinance Brady
bonds with new debt having lower interest rates
because the original Brady bonds were issued at 
low rates with collateral backing from major industrial-
ized nations.
REFERENCES
Bernanke, Ben S. (1990), “On the Predictive Power of
Interest Rates and Interest Rate Spreads,” New England
Economic Review (November/December): 51–68.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder (1992), “The Fed-
eral Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Trans-
mission,” American Economic Review 82 (September):
901–21.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler (1989), “Agency
Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations,” American
Economic Review 79 (March): 14–31.
Duca, John V. (1987), “The Effects of Credit Availability
on Consumer Durable Expenditures,” Federal Reserve
Board Economic Activity Section Working Paper no. 80,
(Washington, D.C., November).
Duca, John V., and Bonnie Garrett (1995), “Credit Availa-
bility, Bank Consumer Lending, and Consumer Durables,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Research Paper no. 9514
(Dallas, October).
Duca, John V., David M. Gould, and Lori L. Taylor 
(1998), “What Does the Asian Crisis Mean for the U.S.
Economy?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest
Economy, Issue 2, March/April, 1–6.
Duca, John V., and Stuart S. Rosenthal (1991), “An 
Empirical Test of Credit Rationing in the Mortgage
Market,” Journal of Urban Economics 29 (March):
218–34.
Dudley, William C., and Edward F. McKelvey (1998), 
“The Brave New Business Cycle: Seven Years Old and
Still Counting,” U.S. Economic Research, (March 17),
Goldman Sachs Global Economic Research.13 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1999
Duffee, Gregory R. (1998), “The Relation Between
Treasury Yields and Corporate Bond Yield Spreads,”
Journal of Finance 53 (December): 2,225–41.
Emery, Kenneth M. (1996), “The Information Content of
the Paper–Bill Spread,” Journal of Economics and
Business 48 (February): 1–10.
Friedman, Benjamin, and Kenneth Kuttner (1992),
“Money, Income, Prices, and Interest Rates,” American
Economic Review 82 (June): 472–92.
——— (1998), “Indicator Properties of the Paper–Bill
Spread: Lessons from Recent Experience,” Review of
Economics and Statistics 80 (February): 34–44.
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier (1992),
“The Stampede Toward Defined Contribution Pension
Plans: Fact or Fiction?” Industrial Relations 31 (Spring):
361–69.
Hafer, R. W., and Kutan, A. M. (1992), “On the Money-
Income Results of Friedman and Kuttner,” Southern
Illinois University at Edwardsville Working Paper no.
92–03 (Edwardsville, Ill.).
Ippolito, Richard A. (1995), “Toward Explaining the Growth
of Defined Contribution Plans,” Industrial Relations 34
(January): 1–20.
Jaffee, Dwight M. (1975), “Cyclical Variations in the Risk
Structure of Interest Rates,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 1 (July): 309–25.
Jaffee, Dwight M., and Thomas Russell (1976), “Imperfect
Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 90 (November): 651–66.
Kennickell, Arthur B., and Martha Starr-McCluer (1994),
“Changes in Family Finances from 1989 to 1992:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin 80 (October): 861–82.
Lacker, Jeffrey M. (1991), “Why Is There Debt?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review,
July/August, 3–19.
Lacker, Jeffrey M., and John A. Weinberg (1989),
“Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Verification,”
Journal of Political Economy 97 (December): 1,345–63.
Rosenthal, Stuart S., John V. Duca, and Stuart A. Gabriel
(1991), “Credit Rationing and the Demand for Owner-
Occupied Housing,” Journal of Urban Economics 30
(July): 48–63.
Schreft, Stacey L., and Raymond E. Owens (1991),
“Survey Evidence of Tighter Credit Conditions: What
Does It Mean?” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Economic Review, March/April, 29–34.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Andrew Weiss (1981), “Credit
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”
American Economic Review 71 (June): 393–410.
Townsend, Robert M. (1979), “Optimal Contracts and
Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification,”
Journal of Economic Theory 21 (October): 265–93.
Williamson, Stephen D. (1986), “Costly Monitoring, Finan-
cial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing,”
Journal of Monetary Economics 18 (September): 159–79.